Cultural and historical roots for design and technology education: why technology makes us human by McLain, M et al.
  
 
E-mail: Matt McLain 
 m.n.mclain@ljmu.ac.uk   
223 
 
Cultural and historical roots for design and technology education: why 
technology makes us human 
Matt McLain, 
Liverpool John Moores University, Liverpool, UK 
 
Dawne Bell, 
Edge Hill University, Ormskirk, UK 
 
David Wooff, 
Edge Hill University, Ormskirk, UK 
 
David Morrison-Love, 
University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK 
In the continuing context of curriculum change within English education, this paper explores the cultural 
and historical roots of design and technology, as an educational construct, distinct from design or 
engineering, which exist as career paths outside of the school curriculum. It is a position piece, drawing 
on literature from a wide range of sources from writing and outside of the discipline. The authors revisit 
the original intention of design and technology as a national curriculum subject and within the 
contemporary challenges, highlight the historical and social importance of technology, including 
designing and making, as an essentially human and humanising activity. The aim being to contribute to 
the theorisation and philosophy of the subject, where typically practitioners tend to focus on practical 
and potentially mundane concerns. This paper asserts that technological human activity is rooted in 
technological innovation and determinism. The aim is to add to the literature and debate around the place 
and value of design and technology. The argument for retention of the subject, as part of a broad and 
balanced curriculum, is presented from a socio-technological perspective; recognising the value of the 
subject as cultural rather than a merely technical or as an economic imperative. 
Key Words: culture, design and technology education, philosophy of technology, socio-technological 
human activity. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper as a thinking piece, presenting the rationale for design and technology education as a discipline 
within the curriculum, at the local (school), national (statutory) and international (research and scholarship) 
level. Defences of the subject have been presented based on capability (Black and Harrison, 1985), design 
(Williams and Wellbourne-Wood, 2006), and within the context of the Science Technology Engineering 
Mathematics (STEM) agenda (Bell, 2016; Harrison, 2011). In this paper, we present a cultural and historical 
perspective on technology, positioning it as a fundamentally human activity (McLain, 2012; Bakhurst, 2007; 
Florman, 1987, in Mitcham, 1994) academically and culturally comparable with science, art, religion and sport 
(McGinn, 1978, in Mitcham, 1994).  
 
This paper explores design and technology, as subject in the school curriculum (NCC, 1990: 23; DfE, 1995, 10; 
DfE, 2011b), focusing on cultural and historical factors relating to technological activity as a fundamental 
human trait, inextricably linked to the evolution of our species and societies. With this paper, we will not 
attempt to provide the historical context of the subject. Excellent historical accounts of the origins of design and 
technology education already exist, for example Atkinson (1990) who explores its evolution and transformation 
from handicraft through to design and technology as we know it today and Allsop and Woolnough (1990), who 
also investigated the contentious relationship between science and technology in the wake of the subject’s 
emergence in the English curriculum. Precursors to design and technology have also been well documented, for 
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example Penfold (1987), who narrates the struggles of educators in the gradual emergence of a more designerly 
curriculum in pre-national curriculum England, the resistance to change, a theme described as subcultural 
retreat by Paechter (1995). 
 
After design and technology’s rise to prominence as the first subject to be defined by the National Curriculum 
in England (NCC, 1990; DES and WO, 1988) towards the end of the last millennium, two decades on the 
subject came under scrutiny of government advisors (DfE, 2011a) and outside commentators (Miller, 2011; 
McGimpsey, 2011). More recently, through the introduction of the English Baccalaureate (EBacc) and 
proposals to extend the “school day to include a wider range of activities, such as sport, arts and debating” 
(DFE, 2016: 21), the status of traditional academic subject has been elevated, leaving “little room, if any, for 
creative, artistic and technical subjects” (BACC for the Future, 2018) resulting in current challenges outlined 
by the Design and Technology Association (D&TA) for “teacher recruitment, reducing curriculum time, 
decreasing GCSE entries, access to professional development” (D&TA, 2018). 
2. PROBLEM FINDING AND PROBLEM SOLVING 
In the contemporary educational context, design and technology faces several currently insurmountable 
problems. Adopting a suitably designedly approach, let us engage with problem finding (McLain, 2012; Chand 
and Runco, 1993; Csikszentmihalyi, 1988). Design and technology has been identified as having “weaker 
epistemological roots” (DfE, 2011a: 24) than other curriculum subjects, such as mathematics, where the bodies 
of knowledge are clearly defined. In his work, Bernstein (1990) explores the nature of subjects, and their 
disciplinary boundaries, supporting the aforementioned concern regarding design and technology’s 
epistemological basis. Bernstein’s framework classifies subjects as having strong or weak boundaries, 
depending on how clearly bodies of knowledge can be defined. Utilizing mathematics as an example, whilst 
aspects of mathematical knowledge are included within other subjects, the knowledge is largely readily 
identifiable as belonging to the subject. For example, in design and technology a pupil may use knowledge of 
geometry when designing a prototype, but the knowledge is clearly mathematical. Whereas, again in design and 
technology, the same pupil may employ her imagination and communicate them through a sketch. In this 
typically design and technology scenario, both imagination and sketching are not the sole domain of the 
subject. 
 
Taking a step back from education, technology is a complex phenomenon and term and “does not mean exactly 
the same thing in all contexts” (Mitcham, 1994: 152). If it is true that technology eludes a single universal 
definition by philosophers, it should not come as a surprise that any school subject directly related to 
technology would be similarly challenged. Reviewing philosophical discourse, Mitcham sought “to identify the 
stance and distinctions proper to thinking about technology philosophically” (p.267), presenting “set of quasi-
empirical categories for speaking about technology” (p.269): technology as object, as knowledge, as activity 
and as volition.  
 
The following discussion will elaborate on the challenges in defining design and technology using Bernstein’s 
classification and framing and Mitcham’s modes of the manifestation of technology, scoping out the subjects 
epistemological problem. The agreement will be developed proposing an historical and cultural rationale for the 
inclusion of design and technology in a board and balance curriculum, as a focal point for socio-technologic 
human activity, drawing on thinking from social constructivism, cultural psychology and neuroscience to 
challenge the academic hegemony. 
3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
This paper explores literature from a variety of disciplines to discuss technological activity, within a social 
constructivism framework in the educational traditions of Dewey and Vygotsky. Our analysis considers 
technology, including tools and artefacts, as “cultural entities” and is informed by an “object-orientedness of 
action” view of the mind (Engeström, 2009: 54). Latour (2008) and Harman (2002), building on Heidegger’s 
philosophy of tool use, discuss the nature of objects and the influence they weld on human behaviour and 
development. Vygotsky discussed the importance of technological activity as a key to understanding the mind, 
and the link between tool use and speech (Tappan, 1997; Vygotsky, 1978). 
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Cole (2007) describes Wartofsky’s assertion that the “creation of artefacts, including the words of one’s 
language” is distinctively human Wartofsky (1979) outlines three levels of artefact (Table 1) with both 
technological and social tools as primary artefacts used in the production of the means to perpetuate the species. 
Secondary artefacts incorporate primary artefacts and their application, including the transmission and 
preservation of technical knowledge. Tertiary artefacts enter an imaginary realm, allowing for praxis to be 
transferred and transformed “beyond the immediate context” (p.91). 
Table 1. Wartofsky’s taxonomy of artefacts 
Level Description 
Primary: Technological (e.g. a hammer) and social (e.g. words) tools.  
Secondary: Includes the preservation and transmission of skills or modes of action. 
Tertiary: Creativity, imagination and transfer beyond the immediate context. 
 
According to Bell et al. (2017) as a single subject, in part because of its interdisciplinary nature, design and 
technology, struggles to surrender its axioms, which is a contributory factor in the subject’s failure to establish 
itself as a single discipline (Bell, Morrison-Love, Wooff and McLain, 2017). In the following sections we 
explore the ‘problem’ on the basis of an assumed ontological richness, if a not yet defined epistemological as 
one; as an artefact mediated discipline that not only uses artefacts and tools, but one that designs, makes and 
evaluates them. 
4. BERNSTEIN’S CLASSIFICATION AND FRAMING OF EDUCATIONAL KNOWLEDGE 
In this section we will explore design and technology through the lens of Bernstein’s classification and framing 
of educational knowledge (1971).  
 
In his work, British Sociologist Basil Bernstein explores social class, performance at school and how education 
reproduces inequality. Through analysis of language, Bernstein (1990) sought to understand why children in 
lower social class do less well in school. In his early work he sought to distinguish between school [elaborate] 
and everyday [restricted] language in order to help analyse how children access and subsequently make sense 
of what is going on at school, in order to understand how children access and apply knowledge. He contended 
that the language used to teach a subject either enables or prevents access and found that children from working 
class backgrounds are less likely to achieve academically because of their limited understanding of the 
language used in school. Consequently, they are less able to access information received and subsequently 
communicate their own thoughts and ideas.  
 
In earlier work, Bernstein (1971) codified subjects to define the distinction between different types of 
curriculum and illustrate the power [classification] relationships between what is taught, and the control 
[framing] of how knowledge is learnt. The collection code is characterised by subjects that have distinct 
external boundaries, well insulated from other disciplines. Within these are subject’s knowledge is deemed to 
be ‘sacred’ and as such are subjects that reside within this category are deemed to be ‘strong’. In contrast within 
the integrated code there is little insulation between subject boundaries. This may reflect thematic based work 
or homogenous teaching approaches and hence these subjects are classified as ‘weak’. Within the integrated 
code the teacher needs to be able to handle uncertainty, there is a balance of power between the teacher and the 
student. 
 
Brought about by the need to consistently embrace and adapt to change in order to meet curriculum demands, 
and reflect a world with ever progressing technological advancement, design and technology is characterised by 
perpetually shifting curriculum content, and a fluctuating knowledge and skills base that manifests and 
perpetuates subject instability and in doing so, it presents itself as a subject with weak external boundaries. 
 
As a result, design and technology is a subject misunderstood, perceived to be lower in status than its well-
established counterparts. In practice, in direct contrast to its STEM counterparts of science and mathematics, 
which are classified as subjects with strong external boundaries (Bernstein 2000, 1971), those working to 
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deliver the subject have to constantly justify design and technology’s place as a subject of worth within a 
hierarchy of well-established curriculum subject disciplines. When presented as a single subject, with nomadic 
characteristics, and weak external boundaries that are difficult to define, design and technology manifests as a 
soft, applied subject (Bernstein, 2000, 1971), and as such, within the hierarchy of its academic counterparts 
finds itself in an uncomfortable, and often isolated place. 
 
Bernstein provides a way to understand the difficulty that design and technology faces in justifying its place in 
the curriculum on epistemological grounds. Where the prevailing bias in education and education policy is 
towards definable knowledge, the relative ontological strength (Morrison-Love, 2017; McLain, 2012) of the 
subject is overlooked. The following discussion will explore the cultural and historical expression of 
technology. 
5. MITCHAM’S MODES OF THE MANIFESTATION OF TECHNOLOGY 
Acknowledging the complexity of technology, Mitcham (1994) presents an analysis of the issues in the 
philosophy of technology, which encompasses a breadth of philosophical perspectives from both inside 
(engineering) and outside (humanities) technology. Figure 1 (p.160) illustrates the developing framework, 
exploring the broad and interrelated categories of technology as object, technology as knowledge, technology 
as activity, and technology as volition. 
 
 
Figure 1. Mitcham's Modes of the manifestation of technology 
The framework encompasses views as diverse as technological determinism, where technology is considered as 
influencing or controlling human activity (Roe Smith, 1994), to human freedom, where human will and 
creativity directs technology (Hickman, 2001; Feenberg, 1999). Further, it is open to viewing knowledge from 
both reductionist and transcendent perspectives.  
 
Technology viewed as object, as defined by Mumford (1934, in Mitcham, 1994: 162) includes: clothing 
(“…utilitarian and decorative”), utensils (“… storage containers and instruments of the… home”), structures 
(“houses and other stationery artefacts”), apparatus (“…containers for some physical or chemical process…”), 
utilities (“… roads, reservoirs, electric power networks”), tools (“instruments operated manually… to move or 
transform the material world…”), machines (“tools that do not require human energy input…”) and automata 
(“… machines that require neither human energy input nor immediate human direction”). These categories, 
with the possible exception of apparatus and utilities, are resonant with artefacts that learners design and make 
in design and technology classrooms.  
 
Mitcham begins with an epistemological analysis of technology as knowledge with a taxonomy of increasingly 
conceptual distinctions: sensorimotor skills (acquired through heuristic or mimicry), technical maxims 
(including rules of thumb and recipes), descriptive laws (recognising cause and effect – if you do X then Y will 
happen), and technological theories (involving real world application of theory and/or operation of humans and 
technology). Mitcham draws parallels with Dreyfus’ five stages of skill development: novice, advanced 
beginner, competency, proficiency, and expertise (Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 1986); although he goes on to infer 
that ‘knowing how’ (procedural knowledge) is a heuristic precursor to a higher level ‘knowing that’ 
(conceptual knowledge), a notion that Ryle (1949, 1990) and McCormick (1997) challenge.  
 
Technology as activity can be viewed as the factor that unites knowledge and volition resulting in the 
production of technological objects (artefacts). Indeed technological objects, as tools in the ideation and 
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realisation process or the outcomes themselves, can likewise influence technological activity. Mitcham list 
typical behaviours in technological activity loosely as actions (crafting, inventing, and designing) and processes 
(manufacturing, working, operating, and maintaining). A further dimension to technology as activity is the 
distinction between useful (or servile) and fine (or liberal) arts, the names of which indicate the historic and 
cultural bias, elevating the fine (or use-less) arts. In technology as activity, it becomes clear that design and 
technology cannot lay sole claim on the domain of technology. Therefore the subject must articulate the unique 
perspectives and pedagogies that it lends to a broad and balanced curriculum and what dispositions it 
engenders; such as design “as a method of practical action” (Mitcham, 1994: 228-229) that underlies all 
practical activity (including business, education, law and politics). 
 
In technology as volition, Mitcham moves the discourse towards philosophy and into the mind, motivation and 
intentionality. Interpretations of volition in technology are wide and varied, ranging from biological imperative 
to the competing drives for control and freedom. Mitcham quotes Ferré (1988) describing technology as 
“practical implementations of intelligence” (p.30) and the incremental improvements of this “embodied in 
culture and perpetrated by tradition” (p.36-37); positioning technological human activity as predating modern 
scientific notions and reconstructions. Mitcham describes volition as the most subjective of the modes of 
technology, expanding that one cannot directly know or perceive volition, relying on external action to infer the 
intention and character the actor.  
 
Mitcham acknowledges that the four modes of technology overlap and interact. In this it is helpful to ask 
ourselves how this relates to design and technology as curricular entity. He exemplifies the interaction of 
technological object and activity (without knowledge and volition) as “play with toys” (p.269), and one could 
liken this to focused making activities in design and technology, which engage learners in the development of 
skills, as knowing how. In design & technology, technological volition and activity might result in speculative 
designing; to meet a perceived need or desire. Therefore, it is important to consider the breadth and complexity 
of technology in constructing not only a strong defence of the role of design and technology in the curriculum, 
but also in designing an appropriate curricular experience for the classroom. 
6. SOCIO-TECHNOLOGICAL HUMAN ACTIVITY 
The social constructivist view of human evolution and development acknowledges the intertwined nature of 
technology and society, and mediating artefacts as “objectifications of human needs and intentions” (Daniels, 
Cole and Wertsch, 2007: 255; Wartofsky, 1979; Vygotsky, 1978), akin to Mitcham’s aforementioned 
technological volition. Design and technology takes a holistic mind-body stance, as described by Kimbell, 
Stables and Green’s (1996) in their model of the dynamic interaction between head (thinking) and hand (acting) 
during designing and making activity. The dualistic worldview of Descartes that considers the mind and body 
as separate entities, privileging the mind over the body, has been challenged by Ryle (1949), Vygotsky and 
Dewey (Russell, 1993). Dewey and Vygotsky challenged reductionism and dualistic divisions within education 
and beyond, “denying all absolutes to assert a dynamic holism” (Russell, 1993: 173-174). Furthermore, 
Brunner (2009) builds on the cultural aspect of this holistic view of the “technical-social way of life” (p. 160) in 
human evolution. 
 
Figure 2. Mobius, representation of the dynamic interaction between technology and society 
The Mobius strip (Figure 2) provides an apt visual metaphor for the dynamic relationship between technology 
and society, avoiding the question of pre-eminence or causal nature of one over the other. That being said, 
emerging evidence from the study of the brain suggest a causal effect from the tool use to the development of 
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language (Johnson-Frey, 2004; Wolpert, 2003; Greenfield, 1991). Furthermore Tallis (2003), acknowledging 
the relationship between tools and language, cites fossil records as evidence of tool use predating capacity for 
speech and therefore a more convincing argument for the achievements of humans beyond our fellow hominids. 
The social achievements of modern humans, including the liberal arts, are facilitated by technology. For 
example, the painter does not normally paint without a brush (or other suitable implement), nor does the 
sculpture carve without the appropriate tools; both of which being technological artefacts, which have enabled 
artistic expression and the evolution of styles. 
 
Campbell (2011) explores intelligence and the relationship between language use and tool use, identifying 
common features and the notion of a tool as an extension of the body. It may be that to talk about tools and 
language as different things is unhelpful, as the language extends the embodied mind to communicate with 
others through speech and writing. Writing as a cultural psychologist, Cole (1996) describes the example of a 
visual impaired person using a stick (white cane) and asks whether the sensation begins in the hand or in the 
stick. Nickerson (2005) discusses technology as a cognitive amplifier “either by facilitating reasoning directly 
or by reducing the demand that the solution of a problem makes on one’s cognitive resources, thereby freeing 
those resources up for other uses” (p.6). In this way people use technology “to outsource, or distribute, 
elements of cognitive capacity” (McLain, 2012: 334). 
7. CONCLUSION 
Through this paper we have explored the value of technology within society, how technological developments 
have helped to shape our evolution and society. We have also sought to locate the problem of design and 
technology as a subject in the curriculum with an undefined epistemological basis. First, through the lens of 
Bernstein’s classification and framing of educational knowledge, which explains the difficulty the subject has 
in defining what is uniquely design and technology knowledge. Second, through the lens Mitcham’s modes of 
the manifestation of technology, which explains the difficulty in defining technology. In this paper we begin to 
argue for design and technology education at the heart of the modern democratic curriculum as a cultural. 
8. REFERENCES 
Allsop, T. and Woolnough, B. (1990). The relationship of technology to science in English schools, Journal of Curriculum 
Studies, 22(2), p.127-136. doi.org/10.1080/0022027900220202 
Atkinson, S. (1990). Design and Technology in the United Kingdom, Journal of Technology Education, 2(1). Available at 
https://scholar.lib.vt.edu/ejournals/JTE/v2n1/html/atkinson.html [Last Accessed 05 April 2018] 
Bell, D. (2016). The reality of STEM education, design and technology teachers’ perceptions: a phenomenographic study. 
International Journal of Technology and Design Education, 27(1), pp.61-79. DOI: 10.1007/s10798-015-9300-9 
BACC for the Future (2018). What is the EBacc? Why does this matter? [online]. Available at 
https://www.baccforthefuture.com/ [last accessed 05 April 2018] 
Bakhurst, D. (2007). Vygotsky’s Demons. In H Daniels, M. Cole, and J.V. Wertsch (Eds). The Cambridge Companion to 
Vygotsky. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press 
Bell, D., Morrison-Love, D., Wooff, D. and McLain, M. (2017). Analysing design and technology as an educational 
construct: an investigation into its curriculum position and pedagogical identity, The Curriculum Journal, 28(4), 
p.539-558. DOI: 10.1080/09585176.2017.1286995 
Bernstein, B. (1971). On the classification and framing of educational knowledge, in Young M.F.D.(Ed). Knowledge and 
Control: New directions for the sociology of education.  London: Collier MacMillan, 47-69. 
Bernstein, B. (1990). The structuring of pedagogic discourse: Class codes and control (Vol. IV). London: Routledge.  
Bernstein, B. (2000). Pedagogy, Symbolic Control and Identity: Theory, research, critique (revised edition), New York: 
Rowman and Little  
Black, P. and Harrison, G. (1985). In place of confusion: technology and science in the school curriculum. London: 
Nuffield-Chelsea Curriculum Trust.  
Campbell, J. (2011). Why do language use and tool use both count as manifestations of intelligence? In T. McCormack, C. 
Hoerl and S. Butterfill, (eds). Tool Use and Causal Cognition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 169-182 
Chand, I. and Runco, M.A. (1993). Problem finding skills as components of the creative process. Personality and 
Individual Differences, 14(1), pp.155-162. 
Cole, M. (2007). Cultural Psychology. In Y. Engeström, R. Miettinen and R-L. Punamäki. Perspectives on Activity 
Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Cole, M. (1996). Cultural Psychology: a once and future discipline. London: Harvard University Press. 
 229 
 
Cole, M. and Gajdamaschko, N. (2007). Vygotsky and Culture. In H. Daniels, M. Cole, and J.V. Wertsch (Eds). The 
Cambridge Companion to Vygotsky. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1988). Motivation and Creativity: Towards a Synthesis of Structural and Energetic Approaches to 
Cognition. New Ideas in Psychology, 6(2), pp.159-176 
Daniels, H., Cole, M. and Wertsch, J.V. (Eds) (2007). The Cambridge Companion to Vygotsky. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press. 
DfE (2016). Educational Excellence Everywhere [electronic document]. Retrieved from 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/educational-excellence-everywhere  
DfE (2013). National curriculum in England: framework document [online]. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/national-curriculum [last accessed 05 April 2018] 
DfE (2011a). The Framework for the National Curriculum: A report by the Expert Panel for the National Curriculum 
review. London: Department for Education.  
DfE (1995). Design and Technology in the National Curriculum. London: Department for Education. 
D&TA (2018. Designed and Made in Britain...? [online]. Available at https://www.data.org.uk/campaign/ [last accessed 05 
April 2018] 
Dewey, J. (1916). Democracy and Education: an introduction to the philosophy of education.  New York: The Macmillan 
Company. 
Dreyfus, H.L. and Dreyfus, S. (1986). Mind over machine: the power of human intuition and expertise in the era of the 
computer. New York: Free Press. 
Engeström, Y. (2009). Expansive learning: towards an activity-theoretical reconceptualisation. In K. Illeris, K. (2009). 
Contemporary Theories of Learning: Learning Theorists ... In Their Own Words. Oxon, UK: Routledge. 
Feenberg, A. (1999). Questioning technology. London: Routledge.  
Ferré, F. (1988). Philosophy of technology. Englewood Cliffs, USA: Prentice-Hall. 
Florman, S. (1968). Engineering and the liberal arts: at technologist’s guide to history, literature, art and music. New York: 
McGraw-Hill. 
Greenfield, P.M. (1991). Language, tools and brain: The ontogeny and phylogeny of hierarchically organized sequential 
behavior. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 14(4), pp. 531-551. DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X00071235 
Harrison, M. (2011). Supporting the T and the E in STEM: 2004-2010. Design and Technology Education: an 
International Journal, 16(1). Available at https://ojs.lboro.ac.uk/DATE/article/view/1591 [Last accessed 06 April 
2018] 
Hickman, L.A. (2001).  Philosophical tools for technological culture: putting pragmatism to work. Bloominton, USA: 
Indiana University Press.  
Johnson-Frey, S., H. (2004). The neural bases of complex tool use in humans. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 8(2), pp.71-
18. DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2003.12.002 
Kimbell, R., Stables, K. and Green, R. (1996). Understanding practice in design and technology. Buckingham, UK: Open 
University Press.  
Latour, B. (2008). A Cautious Prometheus? A Few Steps Toward a Philosophy of Design (with Special Attention to Peter 
Sloterdijk). [Keynote lecture] Networks of Design meeting of the Design History Society Falmouth, Cornwall, 
3rd September 2008. Available at: http://www.bruno-latour.fr/sites/default/files/112-DESIGN-CORNWALL-
GB.pdf [last accessed 05 April 2018] 
McCormick, R. (1997). Conceptual and Procedural Knowledge. International Journal of Technology and Design 
Education, 7(1-2), pp.141-159. DOI: 10.1023/A:1008819912213 
McGimpsey, I. (2011). Summary of a review of the academic literature on Design and Technology in the National 
Curriculum [Online]. London: RSA. Available at: https://www.thersa.org/globalassets/pdfs/blogs/rsa_dt-
lit_review_final.pdf [last accessed 05 April 2018] 
McGinn, R. (1978). What is Technology?, Research in Philosophy and Technology, 1, pp.179-197 
McLain, M. (2012). The importance of technological activity and designing and making activity, a historical perspective. 
PATT 26 Conference, Technology Education in the 21st Century. Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, 
Sweden. In T. Ginner, J. Hallström & M. Hultén (Eds.). (pp. 330-340). Linköping, Sweden: Linköping University 
Electronic Press, Linköpings universitet. 
Miller, J. (2011). What’s wrong with DT? [Online]. London: RSA. Available at: 
https://www.thersa.org/globalassets/pdfs/blogs/rsa_whats-wrong-with-dt.pdf [last accessed 05 April 2018] 
Mitcham, C. (1994). Thinking through technology: a path between engineering and philosophy. Chicago: The University 
of Chicago Press. 
Morrison-Love, D. (2017). Towards a Transformative Epistemology of Technology Education. Journal of Philosophy of 
Education, 51(1), p.23–37. doi:10.1111/1467-9752.12226 
NCC (1990). Technology in the National Curriculum. London: Department for Education and Science and the Welsh 
Office. 
Nickerson, R.S. (2005). Technology and cognition amplification. In R.J. Sternberg and D.D. Preiss (eds). Intelligence and 
technology: the impact of tools on the nature and development of human abilities. London: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associated Publishers.  
 230 
 
Penfold, J. (1987). From Handicraft to Craft Design and Technology, Studies in Design Education Craft and Technology, 
20(1), p.34-48. 
Roe Smith, M. (1994). Technological determinism is American culture. In M. Roe Smith and L. Marx (eds). Does 
technology drive history? The dilemma of technological determinism. Cambridge, USA: The MIT Press.  
Roe Smith, M. and Marx, L. (1994). Does technology drive history? The dilemma of technological determinism. 
Cambridge, USA: The MIT Press.  
Russell, D. R. (1993). Vygotsky, Dewey, and Externalism: Beyond the Student/Discipline Dichotomy. Journal of 
Advanced Composition, 13(1) p173-197. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20865898 
Ryle, G. (1949, 1990). The concept of mind. London: Penguin Books Ltd. 
Sternberg, R.J. and Preiss, D.D. (eds) (2005). Intelligence and technology: the impact of tools on the nature and 
development of human abilities. London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associated Publishers.  
Tallis, R. (2003). The hand: a philosophical inquiry into the human being. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.  
Tappan, M.B. (1997). Language, Culture, and Moral Development: A Vygotskian Perspective. Developmental Review, 
17(1), p78–100 [online]. Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/drev.1996.0422 [last accessed 06 April 2018] 
Vygotsky, L.S. (1978). Mind in Society: Development of Higher Psychological Processes. Cambridge, USA: Harvard 
University Press 
Wartofsky, M.W. (1979). Models: representation and the scientific understanding. Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel. 
Publishing Company. 
Williams, P.J., Wellbourne-Wood, S. (2006). Design for experience: a new rationale. Design and Technology Education: 
an International Journal, 11(2). Available at https://ojs.lboro.ac.uk/DATE/article/view/Journal_11.2_RES1 [Last 
accessed 06 April 2018] 
Williams, P.J. and Stables, K. (eds) (2017). Critique in Design and Technology Education. Singapore: Springer Nature. 
Wolpert, L. (2003) Causal belief and the origins of technology. Philosophical Transfers of the Royal Society London 2003 
361, 1709-1719. 
